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    Chapter 11: 
Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational  




The objective of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between the growth of off-farm 
employment opportunities and educational attainment in rural China. Since the beginning of 
the reform era in the late-1970‘s off-farm employment has surged and education levels have 
risen dramatically.  However, a persistent gap has formed between rural and urban areas, both 
in terms of income and educational achievement.  Despite the existence of positive returns to 
education in the off-farm labor market (Yang, 1997; Johnson and Chow, 1997), rural children 
spend significantly less time in school than their urban counterparts. (Connelly and Zheng, 
2003; Zheng, 2007)  In a recent study de Brauw and Giles (2006) suggest that the increased 
incidence  of  rural-urban  migration,  which  has  accompanied  the  growth  of  off-farm 
employment, may be partly to blame for discouraging enrollment in upper middle school in 
rural areas. If this is true, then the growth of off-farm employment opportunities may actually 
harm long-term development prospects in rural areas by discouraging investment in human 
capital. 
The  research  reported  here  examines  how  a  child‘s  potential  earnings  and  ability  to 
participate in the off-farm labor market influence the household‘s willingness to allocate their 
children‘s time to education.  Income and participation in each of three major sectors of the 
rural economy are modeled using data taken from the rural sample of the China Household 
Income Project (CHIP).  We estimate the returns to education and the influence of these returns 
on the allocation of time to education by young household members.  By performing this task, 
we gain insight into the relationship between employment opportunities and the likelihood of 
dropping out of school. 
Background 
Figure 1 shows the growth of the rural off-farm labor force over time.  According to the figure, 
28% of the rural labor force was employed off the farm when the CHIP surveys were taken in 
1995.  de Brauw et al. (2002) corroborate this observation, reporting that approximately 32% of McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     224      
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the contemporary rural labor force (corresponding to some 154 million rural laborers nationally) 
was employed off-farm in 1995.  Many of these workers were employed in local Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), but TVEs have not grown fast enough to absorb China‘s enormous 
rural labor force.  This is partly due to an urban bias in the provision of credit services by 
China‘s state-owned financial system (Woo, 2001). 
 
Figure 1: Rural Off-Farm Employment as a Proportion of the total Rural Labor Force 
 
Source: China SSB 
  
Rural-urban migration has become the fastest growing component of off-farm labor in rural 
China (de Brauw et al., 2002).  Before the reform era, internal migration in China was strictly 
controlled  by  an  internal  passport  system  known  as  hukou  (Chan  and  Zhang,  1999).    Each 
person  was  assigned  a  registration  status  based  on  their  place  of  birth,  and  it  was  nearly 
impossible  to  live  or  work  in  an  area  without  local  hukou.  In  1988,  the  hukou  system  was 
reformed  to  allow  rural  residents  to  apply  for  temporary  work  permits  in  urban  areas  (de 
Brauw and Giles, 2006).  These permits made it possible for migrants to work in urban areas, 
but they still did not qualify for the subsidized health care or education benefits provided to 
residents with urban hukou. Workers with rural hukou were also often relegated to transient and 
labor intensive occupations such as construction when they reached the cities.   McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     225      
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Hukou restrictions have led to a circular pattern of internal migration, wherein migrants 
tend to return home periodically only to leave again once they are no longer needed in farm 
work  or  local  employment.  It  is  difficult  to  find  precise  measurements  of  the  incidence  of 
internal migration in China, but according to de Brauw et al. (2002), 54 million of the 154 million 
rural laborers who found work off the farm in 1995 found it outside their own village.   More 
recently, Omelaniuk (2005) put the number of internal migrants in China above 100 million. 
The reform era has also seen several important changes in China‘s educational policy.  In 
1986, the National People‘s Congress (NPC) passed China‘s first compulsory education law 
(NPC,  2005).    All  children  were  required  to  complete  a  minimum  of  nine  years  of  formal 
schooling  beginning  at  age  six.    Some  leeway  was  given  to  areas  where  the  local  level  of 
development made it difficult to provide comprehensive public education, and it is still not 
clear how strictly the law was enforced in more remote rural areas.  Local governments became 
responsible for ensuring that all children within their jurisdiction achieved the state-mandated 
level of education, but these localities were also not allowed to charge tuition.  To make up for 
the lack of funds, rural schools charged ―fees‖ instead of tuition and rural households were still 
forced to fund their child‘s compulsory education.  The result has been persistent rural-urban 
inequality in China‘s educational system (Zheng, 2007).  While 75% of primary school students 
are enrolled in rural schools, these schools receive only 50% of total government expenditures 
on  primary  education.    Despite  the  passage  of  the  compulsory  education  law,  the  average 
education level of the rural work force in 2000 was 7.33 years, 28% lower than the average 
education level of the urban work force.  The relatively high cost of education imposed on rural 
households  is  a  likely  a  cause  of  lagging  educational  attainment  among  rural  households 
compared to those in urban areas. 
Literature Review 
The existing literature provides some evidence for the existence of positive returns to education 
in every sector of China‘s rural economy, but these returns have not yet been fully incorporated 
into the study of rural educational attainment.  Much of the prior research on the relationship 
between  employment and  education in  rural China  focuses  on  the  role  of  education  in  the 
determination of earnings and participation in a given sector.  Many studies have examined the 
role of education as a determinant of migration, with inconclusive results.  Liang, Chen and Gu. 
(2002) and Zhao (1999a) found a positive relationship between the probability of migration and McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     226      
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education, However, Zhao (1999b) reports that the household‘s average level of schooling is 
negatively related to the probability that that household would produce a migrant, despite the 
fact that migrants tended to have a higher level of education than the general rural population.  
Zhao (2002), Meng (1996), and Rozelle, Li, Shen and Hughart (1999) all report no significant 
relationship between education and the probability of migration. 
Few studies have actually attempted to calculate the rate of return to education for migrant 
labor.  Zhao (1997), however, calculates a full rate of return to education for migrant labor by 
multiplying  the  additional  income  expected  in  the  migrant  destination  by  the  marginal 
contribution of education to the probability of migration.  This quantity is then divided by the 
opportunity cost of the time spent on education, yielding a benefit-cost ratio for educational 
investment  with  respect  to  migration.    Because  migrant  earnings  can  seldom  be  observed 
directly, Zhao (1997) uses the prevailing urban wage rate to calculate expected migrant income.  
This method ignores the fact that temporary migrants rarely hold the same kinds of jobs as 
workers with urban hukou. 
The relationship between education and participation in the local wage earning sector has 
received less attention than has the relationship between schooling and migration, but there is a 
consensus  that  higher  levels  of  education  are  positively  associated  with  the  probability  of 
participating in the local wage earning sector (Zhang and Li ,2001; de Brauw et al., 2002; and 
Knight and Song, 2003), and several studies have found positive returns to education  in the 
local wage earning sector (Yang, 1997; Johnson and Chow, 1997).  Parish et al. (1995) report 
positive  returns  to  education  in  the  local  wage  earning  sector  both  in  terms  of  increased 
likelihood of participation and higher wages.  de Brauw and Rozelle (2006) report a similar 
result and improve upon the method used in Parish et al. (1995) by using the Heckman two-step 
procedure to correct for negative selectivity bias leading to underestimation of the returns to 
education in local employment. 
In order to estimate the influence of growth in off-farm employment on the household 
demand  for  education  it  is  necessary  to  estimate  the  return  to  schooling  in  on-farm 
employment,  which  so  far  we  have  assumed,  is  lower  than  in  off-farm  employment.  
Empirically, it is difficult to estimate the returns to education in household farming because an 
individual‘s  contribution  to  household  farm  income  cannot  be  observed  directly.    Several 
studies have addressed this problem by using either the average household level of education McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     227      
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or the education level of a household ―manager‖ as their measurement of human capital.  Yang 
(1997) found positive returns to household manager education in household farming while Li 
and Zhang (1998) found positive returns to both the average household level of schooling and 
the household manager‘s level of schooling.   
Yang (1997) found that the returns to household manager education in household farming 
were actually higher than the returns to individual education in the local wage earning sector.  
The author attributes this result to the household head‘s increased ability to efficiently allocate 
household  resources  between  farm  and  off-farm  employment,  given  that  he  found  that  the 
average level of schooling of farm households had no significant effect on household farm value 
added.  Li and Zhang (1998) found significantly lower returns to education than those found in 
Yang (1997).  The returns to household head education and average level of education never 
exceeded one percent across several different econometric specifications.   
Several  studies  of  countries  other  than  China  have  explored  the  role  of  income  and 
participation in a particular sector of the economy as a determinant of educational attainment. 
Kochar (2004) models household schooling decisions in rural India as a function of the rate of 
return to education in the urban labor market.  Parents choose either a high or a low level of 
education for their child based on the difference between the probability weighted sums of the 
returns to high and low education in the urban and rural labor markets.  Empirical difficulties 
preclude calculating the return to education in the rural labor market, but the study finds that 
higher urban rates of return encourage parents to choose higher levels of schooling for their 
children.  Migration is treated very simplistically, ignoring considerations of distance and the 
importance of migrant networks.  Furthermore, the study ignores the returns to education in 
farming and the local wage earning sector.   
Brown and Park (2001) examine the effects of poverty, school quality and intra-household 
bargaining on school enrollment decisions and school performance in rural China.  They use of 
the proportional hazards model with cross-sectional survey data to study education decisions in 
rural China, but the theoretical model focuses more on household budget constraints and the 
dynamics  of  intra-household  bargaining  than  on  the  effects  of  off-farm  employment 
opportunities.  The study models the education decision as the outcome of bargaining between 
the mother and the father and it specifies a simple rate of return to human capital without 
specifying from which sector(s) this rate was derived.     McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     228      
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Cox  and  Ureta  (2003)  use  a  proportional  hazards  model  is  used  to  study  education 
decisions in rural El Salvador, but no compelling theoretical model is presented to explain the 
determinants  of  household  demand  for  education.    The  study  focuses  mainly  on  budget 
constraints and demographic characteristics of households and individuals as determinants of 
the education decision. The study makes special reference to the role of migration in education 
decisions,  but  only  insofar  as  remittances  provide  extra  income  for  households  to  fund 
education.  
Cox  and  Ureta‘s  (2003)  discussion  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  using 
proportional  hazards  models  to  study  education  with  cross-sectional  data  is  particularly 
informative.    Hazard  models  calculate  the  contribution  of  each  covariate  to  the  risk  of  an 
individual dropping out of the sample at a given grade level conditional upon the individual 
having completed the previous grade level.  They automatically correct for the incidence of 
censored observations, which can become a serious problem at higher education levels.  Hazard 
models also permit the inclusion of individuals who have not yet completed their education, 
which avoids some sample-selection problems.  One major drawback of using the proportional 
hazards model with cross-sectional data is that it forces the researcher to assume that none of 
the covariates included in the regression have changed over time.  For example, the model 
would attribute the same set of conditions to an individual who dropped out of ninth grade in 
the current period and someone who had dropped out of ninth grade four years earlier. This 
problem can be addressed by using a panel data set instead of a cross-section,  
de Brauw and Giles (2006), model the effect of the local migrant network on educational 
attainment explicitly.  The local labor market is ignored and it is assumed that positive returns 
to  education  only  exist  in  the  migrant  labor  market.    The  results  show  that  larger  migrant 
networks  tend  to  discourage  enrollment  in  upper  middle  school,  suggesting  that  increased 
migration might alleviate income inequality between rural and urban areas in the short run, but 
also may contribute to educational inequality between rural and urban communities in the long 
run. 
Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis come from the rural sample of the 1995 China CHIP.  
The CHIP was conducted as a joint effort between the China Academy of Science, the Institute 
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the survey was to measure the composition and distribution of income in both rural and urban 
areas, so it represents a rich source of data on incomes as well as individual, household and 
community  characteristics.    The  rural  sample  includes  7,998  households  comprising  34,  739 
individuals.  Surveys were conducted in 113 counties spread out over 19 provinces.   
 
               Figure 2:  Distribution of Laborers in Each Sector by Education Level 
 
 The data summarized in  Figure 2 show that education levels in all three labor categories 
tend to cluster around five, eight and twelve years.  These levels correspond to the end of 
elementary school, lower middle school and upper middle school respectively.  The distribution 
of local wage earners and migrant workers seem to be more concentrated around the higher 
levels  of  schooling,  while  farmers  cluster  around  lower  levels.    The  positive  relationship 
between the level of education and participation in non-farm work suggests that the returns to 
education are lowest in farming.  It appears that workers participating in the local wage earning 
sector tend to be slightly more educated than migrant workers.  A higher proportion of the 
migrant labor force left school after lower middle school, while a higher proportion of local 
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Table 1 shows the correlation between the proportion of the local labor force engaged in a 
particular kind of off-farm employment and several measures of the local level of education. 
Taken  together,  these  correlations  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  returns  to  education  are 
higher  in  off-farm  employment  and  highest  of  all  in  the  local  wage  earning  sector.  The 
correlations indicate that the incidence of migrant labor is negatively related to local levels of 
education while the size of the local wage earning sector is positively related to local levels of 
education.  The results are strongest at the province level.   






















These correlations may be spurious; it may simply be that households in more developed 
areas,  where  the  local  labor  market  is  larger,  are  better  able  to  afford  education,  while 
households in poorer areas with large numbers of migrant workers pull their children out of 
school earlier because of binding budget constraints.  Deriving the true relationship between 
local employment opportunities and education requires more sophisticated empirical analysis 
controlling for various individual, household and community characteristics. 
Analysis 
We assume that the head of the household maximizes a multi-period household utility function 
such that time is allocated to education until the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs, 
where the marginal benefits are defined as the increase in future income resulting from an 
additional year of schooling and the marginal costs are the direct costs of tuition, books, etc. and 
forgone labor income opportunities.  In any given period t, a worker earns income by allocating McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     231      
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time among three sectors: farming (f), local wage earning (l) and migrant labor (M).  Income in a 
given period can be expressed as, 
(1)          
f lM
a t f t a,t a,t f l,t a,t a,t l M,t a,t a,t M M w t w H +t w H , t w H , ,, = × , × + × Z Z Z  . 
Total labor income (wa) is determined by the time allocated to each sector (tf, tl, tM), the 
unique returns to education paid in each sector ( f ,l ,M), the individual‘s current level of 
education (Ha,t) and a vector of sector-specific determinants Z.  We assume that workers know 
how  much  work-time  they  will  allocate  to  each  sector  in  any  given  period,  but  that  the 
household head is uncertain as to how the child will allocate his work-time in the future.  The 
existence of unique returns to education and labor in each sector suggests that labor is not free 
to move between each sector; otherwise the returns in each sector would have been equalized.  
The  high  incidence  of  migrant  labor  in  conjunction  with  differences  in  returns  among 
employment sectors further suggests that there is excess supply of labor to local wage earning 
jobs, which must then be rationed according to some non-price mechanism.  The household 
head calculates a child‘s expected future earnings as, 
(2)
                       , , , E =E × , +E × , +E ×
f lM
c,t ft c t c,t f l t c t c,t l M,t c,t c,t M M w t w H t w H t w H , Z Z Z .             
The  expectations  parameter  on  child  income  (wc)  in  (2)  reflects  the  household  head‘s 
perception of the child‘s possible labor force outcomes.  When the household head decides how 
much  time  to  allocate  to  education  in  a  given  period,  he  must  do  so  based  on  the  child‘s 
potential earnings in each sector as well as his expectation of the child‘s ability to allocate time 
to each sector.  Based upon these expectations, the household head will allocate the child‘s time 
to balance the marginal increase in future expected earnings and the child‘s forgone expected 
earnings.    This  implies  that  modeling  the  household‘s  education  decision  first  requires 
modeling the relationship between education, income, and participation in each sector. 
Off-Farm Employment: Income in the local wage earning sector will be estimated using the 
Heckman two-step procedure as in de Brauw and Rozelle (2006).  Here, the local wage earning 
sector refers exclusively to employment in a local TVE.  The Heckman procedure corrects for 
possible selection bias and separates each determinant‘s effect on earnings from its effect on the 
probability of participation.  The first step in the Heckman procedure involves estimating a 
probit function for participation.   
The probit function used to estimate participation in the local wage earning sector is,  McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     232      
China's Agricultural Trade: Issues and Prospects 
 
 (3)       1 2 1 2 3 =α+β +β +γ +γ +γ SchYrs Female PartyinHH LandPerCap FlatLand Z                                                                                                                 
          4 1 2 3 +γ +δ +δ +δ +ε F K PerCap Impov MigPctLF LWEPctLF .                      
Definitions and summary statistics for each of the variables are presented in Table 2.1 The 
probit function is used to calculate an Inverse  Mill‘s  Ratio  (IMR),  which  is  then  used  as  a 
regressor in the income equation to correct for selection bias.  Estimating the probit function is 
roughly analogous to estimating E[tl] from equation 2, but instead of estimating the contribution 
of  each  variable  to  the  length  time  allocated  to  a  given  sector,  it  estimates  each  variable‘s 
contribution to the likelihood of allocating positive time to a given sector.  Estimating tl directly 
be more informative, but the large number of censored observations for tl precludes a reliable 
OLS estimate.  Therefore, a tobit function is estimated using the same set of regressors described 
in (3).  This function allows us to observe each variable‘s effect on time allocated to local wage 
earning.  These results are also reported in Table 2.   
In the second step of the Heckman procedure, an income equation is estimated using the 
IMR derived from the probit estimation.  The income equation estimated for the local wage 
earning sector is, 
(4)     .
2
1 2 3 4 1 1 ln( )=α+τ +τ +τ +τ + j +ω +ε DW SchYrs Exp Exp Female PartyinHH λ       
Based  on Figure  2,  years  of schooling  should be  positively associated with  income  and 
participation in the local wage earning sector.  We would also expect off-farm work experience 
to be positively related to income, and a quadratic term is included to capture diminishing 
returns to experience.  We include a dummy variable for gender to capture any bias against 
females in terms of both income and participation in the local wage earning sector. Communist 
Party  membership  should  increase  the  likelihood  of  local  wage  earning  employment  and 
income thanks to the social network it creates.  Party membership is likely one of the non-price 
rationing mechanisms used to distribute the scarce local wage earning jobs.  Per capita land and 
agricultural capital are included along with a dummy variable for land quality (FlatLand) to 




                            
1 Due to inconsistencies in the data reported in the survey, many local wage earners had to be eliminated from the 
sample.  The summary statistics presented in Table 2 may not be representative of the sample as a whole, but they do 
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Table 2: Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Off-Farm Income and Participation 
Model Variables 
Variable 
Name     Definition       
Local Wage 
Earners     Migrants 
                       
              Avg  Std 
Dev 
  Avg  Std 
Dev 
                       
SchYrs    Individual's total years spent in school      6.84  2.75    7.13  2.57 
                       
Exp    Years since individual took off-farm 
employment as their main job 
    3.88  5.50    2.07  3.16 
                       
Female    Is the individual female? (1/0)      0.29  0.45    0.27  0.45 
                       
PartyinHH    Is there a Communist Party member in the 
household? (1/0) 
  0.28  0.45    0.16  0.37 
                       
LandPerCap    Household land not used for homestead  
divided by total household population 
  1.31  1.11    1.49  1.33 
                       
FlatLand    Is the land on which the household sits 
flat? (1/0) 
    0.70  0.46    0.35  0.48 
                       
KFPerCap    Total current value of household physical  
agricultural capital divided by total  
household population 
  196.29  322.83    271.79  438.86 
                       
Impov    Has the county been designated as 
impoverished? (1/0) 
  0.09  0.29    0.32  0.47 
                       
MigPctLF    Percent of the local labor force reporting  
migrant activity 
  5.12  5.75    12.33  9.01 
                       
LWEPctLF    Proportion of the local labor force 
reporting  
participation in local wage earning (%) 
  32.46  24.69    8.83  9.16 
                       
DW    Total wage income divided by days  
allocated to local wage earning 
  32.52  78.72       
                     
R    Total income remitted by an individual 
to the household divided by days 
allocated to migrant labor 
    4.96  9.26 
 
 
These land-related variables reflect the opportunity cost of time spent working in an off-farm 
sector and should be negatively related to participation in local wage earning.  The dummy 
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should have better developed and higher paying local wage earning sectors, so this variable 
should  be  positively  related  to  participation  in  local  wage  earning.    The  last  two  variables 
included in the probit function measure the size of the county‘s local wage earning sector and 
migrant networks.  The size of the local migrant network represents the opportunity cost of 
working in the local wage earning sector and should be negatively related to participation.  
Assuming that local wage earning jobs are rationed, then the estimated coefficient on the IMR 
(ω1)  should  be  negative,  indicating  that  the re  exist  unobserved  variables  increasing  the 
likelihood of selection as well as a lower than average reported daily wage. 
The econometric results are presented in Table 3.  The significant, negative coefficient 
estimate on the IMR is evidence that negative  selection bias was present in this sample.  This 
selectivity bias probably reflects the non-price rationing of local wage employment.  Education 
and experience were positively related to income.  The estimated return to education in a local 
non-farm job is approximately two percent.  This is significantly lower than the results found in 
de Brauw and Rozelle (2006).  The presence of a party member in the household was negatively 
related to income but positively related to participation.  The positive coeffi cient on party 
membership in both the probit and tobit functions suggests that the negative coefficient on 
party  membership  in the  income  equation  is  the  result  of  a  specification  error.  Females 
participated in local wage earning less frequently than men, but gender had no significant effect 
on earnings.  The indicators of household farm productivity, with the exception of land quality, 
were negatively related participation with the exception of the  FlatLand.  This may be because 
areas with higher quality land are more likely to be developed and thus more likely to offer 
greater off-farm employment opportunities.  The explicit measure of the size of the local wage 
earning  sector  (LWEPctLF)  was  positively  associated  with  participation  in  the  local  wage 
earning sector.  The same is true for the size of the local migrant network (MigPctLF), but the 
coefficient estimated in the tobit function was insignificant. 
Migrant Labor: Workers employed as migrant laborers also earn wage income, and under 
ideal circumstances the Heckman procedure would also be applied to this sector.  However, 
migrant income is not observed directly in the CHIP data set.  The best available proxy for 
migrant income is the amount of money each migrant remitted back to their household.   
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Table 3:  Estimation Results for Local Wage Earning Income and Participation 
      Local Wage Earning 
    DV=ln(DW)    Probit    Tobit 
             
SchYrs    0.02 
(2.05)* 
  0.001 
(3.88)** 
  9.63 
(4.15)** 
             
Exp    0.06 
(4.73)** 
       
 
             
Exp2    -0.002 
(-4.13)** 
       
             
Female    -0.05 
(0.69) 
  -0.03 
(-13.62)** 
  -196.55 
(-12.69)** 




(-2.71)**   
0.009 
(3.90)**   
63.04 
(3.93) 
             
LandPerCap 
     
-0.002 
(-2.74)**   
-22.24 
(-3.49)** 
             
FlatLand 
     
0.003 
(1.76)+   
34.05 
(2.05)* 
             
KFPerCap 
     
-.000008 
(-3.13)+   
-0.06 
(-3.23)** 
             
Impov 
     
0.001 
(0.41)   
-4.88 
(-0.21) 
             
MigPctLF 
     
0.0003 
(1.80)+   
1.87 
(1.31) 
             
LWEPctLF 
     
0.002 
(21.95)**   
12.05 
(19.73)** 






5.39)**   
 
     
             
 
  P> chi




T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
**,*,+ represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively 
Includes province level dummies (not shown). 
Probit estimate reports marginal effects. 
Dependent variable in the income equation is average income remitted 
daily. 
 
This is not a perfect substitute for migrant income, especially since it forces us to assume that, 
all migrants of equal levels of education remit an equal proportion of their income.  However, 
using remittances instead of income may actually be more appropriate if we assume that the McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     236      
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household head maximizes the income of the household under his control.  If this is the case, 
then  his  maximization  problem  would  include  remitted  income  rather  than  total  migrant 
income. 
Using  remittances  instead  of  income  presents several  other  empirical  problems.    When 
estimating  a  normal  income  equation,  one  could  plausibly  exclude  anyone  who  reported 
positive  time  allocated  to  a  wage  earning  sector  but  zero  income  derived  from  that  sector.  
However, it would not be legitimate to exclude individuals who report positive time allocated 
to migration but zero remittances.  These individuals may have earned positive income but 
chose not to send any of it home.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to distinguish individuals who 
genuinely  remitted  no  income  from  individuals  who  filled  out  the  survey  incorrectly,  and 
approximately 50 percent of self-reported migrants reported no remittances.  This represents a 
significant  source  of  error.  The  high  incidence  of  zero  remittances  also  means  that  income 
cannot be estimated using the semi-log specification in (4).  
The  migrant  income  equation  estimated  using  the  Heckman  procedure.    The  probit 
function for migrant labor force participation is estimated as, 
(5)       
Z 1 2 1 2 3
4 1 2 3
=α+β +β +γ +γ +γ
+γ +δ +δ +δ +ε. F
SchYrs Female PartyinHH LandPerCap FlatLand
K PerCap Impov MigPctLF LWEPctLF
              
Again, a tobit model is estimated to more accurately show the effect of each variable on the 
individual‘s tM.                                                                                                     
  The  IMR  derived  from  the  probit  function  is  included  as  a  regressor  in  the  income 
equation, 
(6)                .
2
1 2 3 4 1 =α+τ +τ +τ +τ +ω +ε DR SchYrs Exp Exp Female λ                            
The hypothesized signs of the estimated coefficients are similar to those for the local labor 
market participation equation.  Schooling is expected to be positively related to both income 
and  participation  while  females  are  expected  to  spend  less  time  and  earn  less  income  as 
migrants.  The indicators of household agricultural productivity should be negatively related to 
migrant labor force participation, as should household Party membership.  If Party members 
are better able to find scarce local employment for their family members, then households with 
a Party member should be less likely to produce a migrant.  Off-farm employment experience 
should raise income.  Individuals from impoverished counties should be more likely to migrate 
because their home villages present fewer opportunities to earn income.  The size of the local McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     237      
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migrant  labor  force  (MigPctLF)  should  be  positively  related  to  participation  in  that  sector, 
reflecting migrant network effects.  The size of the local wage earning sector (LWEPctLF) should 
be  negatively  related  to  participation  in  the  migrant  labor  force  because  it  represents  an 
opportunity cost of time spent migrating.  
The econometric results for the migrant labor equations are presented in Table 4.  The 
estimation results for the participation functions mostly conformed to expectations.  Schooling 
and the size of the local migrant labor force was positively related to participation in migrant 
labor.  Individuals in households with higher potential agricultural productivity spent less time 
migrating,  as  did  individuals  in  counties  with  larger  local  wage  earning  sectors.    Party 
membership and the local level of development had no significant effect on time allocated to 
migration. 
The estimated income function produced several counterintuitive results.  Gender and off-
farm  experience  appears  to  have  no  effect  on  the  level  of  remittances.    Surprisingly,  an 
individual‘s level of schooling is negatively related to the amount remitted.  Evaluated at the 
mean, an additional year of schooling lowers remittances by .02%, but schooling is positively 
associated with migrant labor force participation.  Furthermore, a simple OLS regression on the 
sample of migrants who reported positive income yields an insignificant, but still negative, 
coefficient estimate for years of schooling.  These counter-intuitive results suggest that using 
remittances to proxy for income is not a good idea. 
Household Farming: Despite the rapid growth of off-farm employment in recent years, 
household farming remains an important source of income for many households.  Of the 7, 998 
households included in the CHIP rural sample, only 71 households derived no income from 
household farming.  Estimating the returns to education in farming should allow us predict 
how households with high agricultural productivity will allocate time to education.  Estimating 
an income function at the household level is not the ideal way to derive the returns to education 
in  household  farming,  but  the  data  set  does  report  each  individual‘s  contribution  to  farm 
income.    Including  the  average  level  of  education  among  all  household  farm  laborers  may 
provide  a  general  idea  of  the  relationship  between  education  and  farm  income,  but  it  is 
problematic  to  calculate  a  return  to  education  that  can  be  readily  compared  to  the  returns 
calculated in the off-farm sectors. 
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      Migrant Labor 
    DV = DR    Probit    Tobit 
             
SchYrs    -0.20 
(-2.36)* 
  0.01 
(16.09)** 
  25.03 
(16.33)** 
             
Exp    -0.07 
(-0.51) 
       
 
             
Exp2    0.007 
(0.98) 
       
             
Female    -0.55 
(-1.05) 
  -0.06 
(-17.50)** 
  -145.88 
(-15.86)** 






(-1.33)   
-4.58 
(-0.41) 
             
LandPerCap 
     
-0.003 
(-2.00)*   
-8.22 
(-2.19)** 
             
FlatLand 
     
-0.008 
(1.95)+   
-19.94 
(-1.96)* 
             
KFPerCap 
     
-.000004 
(-1.15)   
-0.01 
(1.09) 
             
Impov 
     
0.0007 
(0.16)   
-1.07 
(-0.10) 
             
MigPctLF 
     
0.006 
(21.90)**   
15.66 
(21.05)** 
             
LWEPctLF 
     
-0.001 
(-3.00)**   
-1.35 
(-2.60)** 
             
 
    
-3.63 
(4.75)**   
 
     
             
    P> chi2 = 0    Psuedo R2=.05 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
**,*,+ represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
Includes province level dummies (not shown). 
Probit estimate reports marginal effects. 
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equation introduces endogeneity into the value added function.  Households expecting higher 
returns to labor are likely to allocate more time to farming.  To control for this endogeneity, 
farm income is estimated using two-stage least squares.  The first stage estimates the expected 
days allocated to farming using the number of household workers, the presence of a Party 
member in the household, LWEPctLF and MigPctLF as instruments.  Including the number of 
household workers controls for the size of the household labor force while Party membership, 
LWEPctLF and MigPctLF represent household members‘ off-farm employment opportunities. 
The two-stage value added function is specified as, 
Farm Income: 
(7)           
,
1 2 3
4 5 F 6 1
ln( )= α+ψ +ψ +ψ
+ψ +ψ K +ψ +ς +ε
V FarmDays AvgSchYrs Land
FlatLand PctLandIrr Impov                       
      
where time is allocated according to, 
(8)      
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 1 3
4
FarmDays = α+φ +φ +φ +φ
+φ +φ +φ +ς +ς
+ς +ε.
F AvgSchYrs Land FlatLand K
Workers PartyinHH PctLandIrr Impov MigPctLF
LWEPctLF       
Summary statistics for each variable are presented in Table 5.  We would expect the direct 
inputs of farming, including time, land, irrigation, agricultural capital and land quality to be 
positively related to farm value added and time allocated to farming.  Following Yang (1997) 
and Li and Zhang (1998), education is expected to be positively related to farm income (holding 
constant  the  amount  of  time  allocated).    Figure  2  shows  that  farmers  tend  to  be  the  least 
educated workers, so we would expect households with higher levels of education to allocate 
more time to other sectors.  The development dummy (Impov) should be negatively related to 
value added but positively related to participation in farming.  This would reflect lower prices 
for  agricultural  output  sold  in  local  markets  and  the  absence  of  alternative  employment 
opportunities.    Party  membership  and  the  size  of  both  local  off-farm  sectors  measure  the 
household‘s off-farm employment opportunities, so they should be negatively related to the 
time allocated to farming.   
The estimation results are presented in Table 6.  Average schooling is positively related to 
value added, but the estimated return is only 0.5%. This is not directly comparable to the two 
percent return found in the local wage earning sector, but it suggests that the returns paid to 
individual years of schooling on the farm are much lower than the returns paid in the local 
wage earning sector.  The negative coefficient on the household‘s average level of schooling in McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     240      
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the time allocation function further suggests that the returns to education are higher off the 
farm, though the estimate is insignificant.  All of the agricultural inputs included in the model 
were positively related to both farm income and time allocated to farming. 
 
Table 5: Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Farm Income and Participation Model Variables 
Variable    Definition    Avg    St Dev 
V    Total household farm value added in a year 
including the value of crops consumed  
by the household (Yuan) 
7132.05    4695.67 
FarmDays    Total household days allocated to farming    330.61    221.85 
AvgSchYrs    Average years of schooling among household  
members working on the household farm 
5.82    2.41 
Land    Household land not used for homestead    7.18    6.13 
FlatLand    Is the land on which the household sits flat? (1/0)    0.46    0.50 
KF    Current value of household agricultural capital (100 
Yuan) 
12.29    20.82 
Impov    Has the county been designated as impoverished? (1/0)  0.23    0.42 
Workers    Number of household members working on the 
household farm 
2.71    1.12 
PartyinHH    Is there a Communist Party member in the household? 
(1/0) 
0.16    0.37 
MigPctLF    Proportion of the local labor force reporting migrant 
activity (%) 
7.28    6.74 
LandPctIrr    Percent of the household‘s farmland that is irrigated  0.51    0.50 
LWEPctLF    Proportion of the local labor force reporting 
participation in local wage earning (%) 
11.75    13.82 
   
Although  the  estimation  results  mostly  conformed  to  expectations,  there  is  a  potential 
source of bias built into the model.  Twelve percent of the households included in the sample 
substituted hired labor for household labor.  The amount paid to these laborers was netted out 
of gross farm income, but the hours contributed by hired laborers were not reported in the 
survey.  This would artificially inflate the annual farm value added of households that did not 
hire labor.  This could be resolved by subtracting the imputed opportunity cost of the time 
household members spent farming from annual value added, but household farming‘s role as 
an  occupation  of  last  resort  makes it  difficult to  find  the appropriate opportunity  cost  of a 
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Farm Income and Participation 
      DV = ln(V)    DV = FarmDays 
         
FarmDays    0.0009 
(16.33)** 
   
AvgSchYrs    0.005 
(2.10)* 
  -0.54 
(-0.64) 
Land    0.03 
(22.42)** 
  3.22 
(8.03)** 
LandPctIrr    0.08 
(5.48)** 
  16.49 
(3.64)** 
FlatLand    0.16 
(11.26)** 
  17.83 
(3.83)** 
KF    0.003 
(9.40)** 
  0.45 
(4.43)** 
Impov    -0.20 
(-11.63)** 
  43.04 
(7.91)** 
Workers        95.22 
(53.18)** 
PartyinHH        -11.93 
(-2.23)* 
MigPctLF        .05 
(0.14) 
LWEPctLF        -3.74 
(-18.18)** 
         
Adj r2     0.27    0.41 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 **,*,+ represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels 
Includes province level dummies (not shown). 
Dependent variable in the income equation is annual farm value-
added.  
Dependent variable in the time allocation equation is total days 
allocated to household farming by household members. 
 
Education:  Positive returns to education were found in both household farming and the 
local wage earning sector, and our analysis shows that the returns to education are lower in 
household  farming  than  in  local  wage  earning.    However,  the  returns  to  education  in  the 
migrant labor market are still unknown.  Education is positively associated with the likelihood 
of participation in both local wage earning and migration, but negatively associated with time 
allocated to farming.  This suggests that the returns to education are higher in the migrant labor 
market than in household farming, but it is still not clear whether higher returns to education 
are received by migrants or local wage earners.  Figure 2 shows that local wage earners tend to McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     242      
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be  more  educated  than  migrants,  suggesting  that  the  returns  to  migrant  education  fall 
somewhere between those paid to local wage earners and household farmers, but we can not 
know the actual size of these returns without more data on migrant income. 
Assuming  that  the  returns  to  education  are  highest  in  the  local  wage  earning  sector, 
followed by the migrant labor market and household farming, we would expect individuals 
with relatively higher potential earnings and expected time allocation to local wage earning to 
spend  the  most  time  in  education.    Similarly,  individuals  with  relatively  higher  potential 
earnings and expected time allocation to household farming should spend the least amount of 
time in education.  Individuals with higher expected earnings and time allocation in the migrant 
labor sector would spend more time in education than a potential farmer but less time than a 
potential local wage earner.   
These expectations cannot be translated directly into hypothesized signs on coefficients in 
an education demand function because the potential benefits of an additional year of education 
depend on an individual‘s subjective discount rate.  However, prior research suggests that the 
discounted returns to education in areas with large migrant networks are such that students are 
more likely to drop out at the lower middle school level (de Brauw and Giles, 2006).  This 
implies that higher potential earnings and expected participation in the migrant labor sector 
would have a negative effect on educational attainment at the lower middle school level and 
above.  Assuming that the returns to education are lower in household farming than in migrant 
labor, we would expect the opportunity cost effect for potential farmers to dominate at even 
earlier ages..  Higher potential earnings and expected participation in household farming would 
have a negative effect on educational attainment beginning in elementary school.  If the returns 
to education in the local wage earning sector are higher than those paid in the migrant labor 
market, then it may be that the returns to education in local wage earning are sufficiently high 
to encourage investment in education through the end of upper middle school.   
These hypotheses can be tested using a proportional hazards model as in Brown and Park 
(2002) and Cox and Ureta (2003).  The general form of the hazard model is: 
(9)                                                     i h t h t 0 ( )= ( )exp( ). βV  
 
The term hi(t) in equation (9) represents the individual‘s probability (hazard) of dropping 
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covariates  (V)  with  their  corresponding  estimated  coefficients  (β).    The  estimation  of  the 
baseline  hazard  function  will  account  for  the  natural  tendency  of  individuals  to  drop  out 
around the fifth, ninth and twelfth years, net the estimated effect of the covariates.  Using the 
proportional hazards model forces us to assume that the covariates do not change over time.  
This could be a significant source of error.  In order to adjust for this error, all individuals who 
dropped out school more than four years before the survey was taken were eliminated from the 
sample.   
An individual‘s potential earnings and participation in each sector is incorporated into the 
education model by including the determinants of participation and income from the previous 
section as covariates.  Some of the determinants, such as education level and years of off-farm 
labor experience, cannot be used in the model.  Other variables, such as gender, have the same 
relationship with participation and income in more than one sector.  Identifying the effect of 
earnings opportunities in a given sector requires finding significant, positive determinants of 
either income or participation in only one sector.  If such a positive determinant of income or 
participation increases an individual‘s hazard of leaving school, the returns to education in that 
sector  are  too  low  to  induce  household  investment  in  education.    Similarly,  if  a  positive 
determinant of income in a given sector decreases an individual‘s hazard of leaving school, then 
the returns to education in this industry are sufficiently high to induce household investment in 
education.   
The size of the local wage earning sector and Party membership will be used to identify the 
effect of local wage earning opportunities.  The size of the local migrant network will be used to 
identify the effect of migrant labor opportunities.  Per capita household levels of the agricultural 
inputs KF and Land along with FlatLand and LandPctIrr will be used to identify the effect of 
potential  household  farming  employment.    The  model  will  also  include,  the  individual‘s 
gender,  net  household  income,  average  parental  level  of  schooling  and  the  local  level  of 
development, though they cannot be used to identify the effect of employment in a particular 
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Table 7:  Summary Statistics and Definitions for the Education Model Variables 
 
 
Summary statistics for each variable are presented in Table 7. The determinants of income 
and participation in farming and migrant labor should increase the risk of dropping out of 
school  while  the  determinants  of  income  and  participation  in  local  wage  earning  should 
decrease the risk of dropping out. Females and individuals in impoverished regions should be 
more likely to drop out of school.  The parents‘ average level of schooling and net household 
income should decrease the hazard of dropping out. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 8.  Column (1) presents the results for grades 
one  through  twelve  combined.    The  estimation  results indicate  that  a  one  percentage  point 
increase in the proportion of the local labor forced engaged in migrant labor increases the risk of 
dropping out of school by approximately two percent.  The size of the local wage earning sector 
appears  to  have  no  significant  effect  on  the  risk  of  dropping  out,  but  party  membership 
decreases the risk of dropping out by 16%.  The results for the household farming variables 
were mixed.  Most of the farming variables had a positive effect on the risk of dropping out, but 
only the per capita level of agricultural capital had a significant effect.  As predicted, females 
were  more  likely  to  drop  out  and  higher  levels  of  parental  schooling  reduced  the  risk  of 
dropping out. 
Variable     Definition  Avg     St Dev 
             
SchYrs    Individual's total years spent in school  5.79    2.88 
Impov    Has the county been designated as impoverished? (1/0)  0.22    0.41 
NetHHInc    Net household income in 1995 (Yuan)  7503.02    6168.92 
AvgPrntSch    Average schooling level of parents  5.65    2.44 
KF/Capita    Current value of physical agricultural capital divided by the 
household population 
314.72    516.10 
Land/Capita    Land not used for homestead divided by household 
population 
1.61    1.31 
LandPcntIrr    Percent of the household‘s farmland that is irrigated  0.47    1.37 
FlatLand    Is the surrounding land flat? (1/0)  0.48    0.50 
MigPctLF    Percent of the local labor force reporting migrant activity  7.53    6.94 
PartyinHH    Is there a Communist Party member in the household? (1/0)  0.17    0.38 
LWEPctLF    Percent of the local labor force reporting participation in the 
local wage earning sector 
11.16    12.59 
Female     Is the individual female? (1/0)  0.46    0.50 McGuire et al.  Chap.11: Off-Farm Employment Opportunities and Educational Attainment     245      
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The estimation results may have been weaker than expected because the sample included 
individuals from lower grade levels, where drop-outs are relatively scarce.  Table 9 shows the 
drop-out rate for a given interval of school years.  According to the table, drop-outs tend to 
occur between grades five and ten.  Examining this subset of the student population may yield 
more precise estimates.  Column (2) presents the results for the education model using only 
individuals in grades five through ten.  The estimation results closely resemble those for the 
whole sample.  Higher levels of parental schooling reduced the risk of dropping out while 
females were more likely to drop out.  The size of the local wage earning sector still had an 
      (1)    (2) 
    Years 1-12     Years 5-10 
         
Impov    0.977 
(-0.31) 
  0.983 
(-0.20) 
NetHHInc    1.000 
(-0.92) 
  1.00 
(-0.13) 
AvgPrntSch    0.906 
(-8.87)** 
  0.915 
(-7.30)+ 
KFPerCapita    1.000 
(2.18)* 
  1.000 
(1.54) 
LandPerCapita  1.006 
(0.25) 
  1.035 
(1.44) 
LandPcntIrr    0.980 
(-1.29) 
  0.988 
(-0.67) 
FlatLand    1.07 
(1.11) 
  1.136 
(1.91)+ 
MigPctLF    1.018 
(3.55)** 
  1.024 
(4.58)** 
PartyinHH    0.840 
(-2.51)* 
  0.87 
(-1.81)+ 
LWEPctLF    0.997 
(-0.87) 
  0.998 
(-0.50) 
Female    1.32 
(5.42)** 
  1.287 
(4.56)** 
         
  P>chi2 = 0.00  P>chi2 = 0.00 
Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 **,*,+ represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
Estimations included province level dummies (not 
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insignificant  effect  on  the  risk  of  dropping  out,  but  Party  membership  reduced  the  risk  of 
dropping out by 13%.  The results for the farm-related variables were still weak; only FlatLand 
had a significant effect on the risk of dropping out.  Most importantly, a one percentage point 
increase in the size of the local migrant labor force increased the risk of dropping out by 2.4%. 
 















The analysis presented here suggests that positive returns to education exist in every sector of 
the rural economy.  The returns to education could only be calculated directly for household 
farming and local wage earning, but the strong positive correlation between education and 
participation in both of the off-farm labor markets suggests that the returns to education are 
higher in the off-farm sectors than on the farm.  The estimated hazard ratios in the educational 
attainment  model  indicate  that  individuals  with  higher  potential  earnings  and  expected 
participation  in  migrant  labor  market  to  drop  out  of  school  earlier.    Household  farm 
productivity and potential local wage employment appeared to have no effect on educational 
attainment, but the error inherent in using a hazard model with cross-sectional data may be 
clouding the results. 
These results could have serious implications for the long-term development of China‘s 
rural areas.  As the migrant labor force grows, the growth of local migrant networks could 
School Year Interval    Drop-Outs 
       
1  2    28 
2  3    30 
3  4    27 
4  5    28 
5  6    121 
6  7    118 
7  8    127 
8  9    480 
9  10    474 
10  11    30 
11  12    51 
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create a preemptive ―brain drain‖ effect, whereby the high opportunity cost of migrant labor 
income discourages households from investing in higher levels of education.  While migrant 
labor may be appealing as a mechanism for overcoming rural-urban income inequality in the 
short-run, its negative effect on the growth of human capital may impede the development of 
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